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Undoubtedly the recent general election in Turkey represents another
step in the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) seemingly unstoppable
domination of Turkish politics, with results only further consolidating its
push towards electoral authoritarianism. What is less appreciated,
however, is the fact that the reasons for the AKP’s authoritarian
dominance lie just as much in the historical weaknesses of the Turkish
democratic system itself as they do in the party’s self-interested and
opportunistic embrace of simple electoral majoritarianism as the optimal
model of democracy for Turkey.
Three weeks after the election results initially took many observers by
surprise in Turkey, and having had a chance to digest them fully, now is a
good time to take stock and think about their implications. The AKP lost
its overall majority in June, called for re-elections, and on 1 November,
managed to comfortably pass the threshold for a return to a single-party
government.
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The resurgence of the AKP can be attributed to their electoral exploitation
of political conditions in Turkey between June and November, a mere
five-months period that encompassed a series of major events. The key
ethical problem here, which seems to be totally forgotten, is that a
second set of elections were unnecessary and a government could have
been formed after the June elections. Instead, President Erdoğan and his
AKP did everything in their power to prevent this. During that period,
Turkey went through an extraordinary period of insecurity and instability,
experiencing the biggest terrorist attack on civilians in its history on 10
October in Ankara, following earlier attacks in Suruç and Diyarbakır. The
fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army resumed, leading to a
large civilian and military death toll, injuries and the imposition of
curfews in many cities and towns.
All this was exploited by the AKP who warned of the need for tried and
tested hands in government and the need for strong and decisive rule to
combat these threats. In addition, previously defecting voters were won
back by the party by emphasising the perils of coalition governments, by
enabling an ‘us-versus-them’ mentality towards groups it sees as a threat,
most notably the Kurds and Gulenists, and finally by deploying a Turkish-
nationalist and conservative discourse against the Peoples’ Democratic
Party (HDP). An uneasy Turkish public, fearful of a civil war in Turkey,
‘voted for stability not chaos’ in the AKP leader Davutoğlu’s words.
What does this tell us about the health of Turkish democracy? All previous
civil and military governments claimed to know what was right for the
people and adopted a top-down and paternalistic attitude to running the
country long before the AKP ever monopolised the idea. This style of
government is entrenched in the system and the AKP has done nothing to
challenge this tradition, instead further reinforcing it. For over a decade
the AKP has been in a position of majoritarian dominance, giving it the
opportunity to tackle some of the systemic structural and politico-cultural
factors hindering Turkish democracy. Rather than pushing for a more
inclusive political system, it chose to use its electoral majority to
accumulate power, marginalise dissent, and try to equate the Turkish
state with the political party.
Free and functioning elections with consistently high turnouts are one of
the strengths of the Turkish political system. However, critical to enabling
effective participation is ensuring that citizens have adequate and equal
opportunities to form their decisions through a strong public sphere
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open to debate. The AKP’s increasingly determined clamp down of any
media critical of it and its use of the courts to pursue private citizens,
journalists and academics for several reasons (including insulting the
President and Prime Minister), and limits imposed on opposition parties’
visibility and audibility inhibit the possibility of open public discussion.
Yet this is more rooted into the Turkish political system than a reflection
of the tactics of the AKP alone. The AKP itself faced party closure cases in
the past during its rule. Several writers, journalists, scholars and activists,
even politicians, were tried and imprisoned, and newspapers and
associations were closed under Article 312 of the Penal Code for
attempting to divide Turkey. The CHP also suffers from a similar
tendency. For instance, in early 2015, the CHP’s general secretary Gürsel
Tekin had declared that after the June elections, if they win the elections,
they would close newspapers that disseminate incorrect and
propagandist information.
Turkish citizens’ ability to develop informed understandings of their
preferences is inhibited also by top-down agenda control. Citizens should
be able to influence the agenda, but, attempts to bring issues other than
those identified by the government for deliberation are suppressed.
Again, this is a familiar feature of Turkish democracy and is not specific to
the AKP. At no point in Turkish political history have citizens felt assured
that their judgements and opinions may still be heeded at some level.
Today, a large section of society believes their dissenting opinions are too
readily dismissed by the ruling elites, condemning their interests to be
marginal to the political process for at least as long as the AKP is in
power. The polarising policies, actions and rhetoric of the AKP hugely
exacerbated this problem and deepened divisions among Turkish society.
Traditionally, Turkey’s political parties have tended to forget that
everyone living in Turkey has a legitimate stake within the political
process. The AKP is not an exception to this either. Even though its
representatives adamantly deny this, the party’s actions suggest
otherwise. The AKP’s actions highlight that it wants to impose its mandate
upon the entire electorate, free of checks and balances. The party justifies
this on the basis that it alone knows what is best for the Turkish people.
This top-down interventionist mentality is part of the long-standing
Turkish democratic culture and it is regrettable that the AKP has not been
an exception. Moreover, the ‘blame discourse’ in Turkish politics, the
focus on individuals and their actions rather than prioritising genuine and
accountable representation, limits engagement with alternative ideas and
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The politics of consensus has little hope of being embraced any time
soon, which will only lead to further decline in the health of Turkish
democracy. Although the AKP had the power and ability to change the
course of politics, to date, it has shunned this. Rather, it followed in the
steps of the previous governments it criticised (recall that prior to
acceding to power the AK Party leadership and the Virtue Party they
emerged from were those who were pursued through the courts and
imprisoned for political dissent). They did this in order to concentrate
power in the hands of its leadership, maintain and expand this power.
Rather than showing humbleness to work with what the electorate voted
for in June and let democracy evolve at its own pace, it exploited political
conditions to generate a plurality and looks set to use this rhetoric to
justify continuing their project of turning the Turkish state into the AK
Party state.
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